Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow American Enterprise Institute and advisor at Gallos Technologies.
Russia is a country unlikely to pass up an opportunity for menace.
Earlier this month, four Russian vessels led by a warship turned up in Ireland’s exclusive economic zone — and stayed there. The ships didn’t just loiter in a random spot, but they remained suspiciously near the undersea cables connecting Ireland with the world. And the Irish Naval Service could do nothing to coax them to leave.
Meanwhile, last month, a group of Russian commercial vessels similarly parked themselves off the Irish coast, close to where a new undersea cable connecting Galway to Iceland was recently inaugurated.
This is all a crucial reminder to other Western countries that protecting critical national infrastructure doesn’t just begin when a threat materializes — it begins by signaling that such menacing moves won’t be tolerated. And those signals need to involve both the government, the private sector and the public.
The world depends on undersea cables for virtually every aspect of daily life. Vitally, however, the sea is also about to become home to the numerous wind turbines our countries need to build if they’re to meet carbon-reduction targets. For example, compared to its 2021 levels, sea-based power generation in the European Union is set to grow an astonishing 25 times by 2030.
But as MEP and retired General Riho Terras, Estonia’s former chief of defense, told me, “This behavior by the Russians seems to be increasing, and it often involves civilian vessels.” “The Russians have always had vessels that look civilian but are military and have advanced technology onboard,” he added.
And now, NATO has elevated infrastructure protection to Chefsache — a matter for the secretary-general.
“For NATO, protecting critical undersea infrastructure is essential to our security and defense because it is key to protecting the security and prosperity of our societies,” Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said this month, having met with private-sector executives to discuss infrastructure protection after the alliance launched a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in February. And this month, Norway and the United Kingdom formed a partnership that “will enhance the two nations’ ability to exercise and operate together and develop capabilities that will protect our shared interests in the North Sea”, according to an announcement by their ministries of defense.
However, it remains unclear who exactly should be patrolling said critical infrastructure — and patrolling so visibly that Russia feels disinclined to cause nuisance or intimidate.
Countries need to make clear they will keep a constant eye on visitors, precisely because pretty much anyone is allowed to enter exclusive economic zones, and pretty much anyone can approach critical national infrastructure on land. But while the Irish navy may be more miniscule than most, no government is big enough to constantly patrol all infrastructure.
This is where the infrastructure’s operators can help.
Undersea cables are, for example, privately owned by companies including Google, Amazon Web Services and Meta, all of which have an obvious interest in ensuring there’s no disruption. Multinationals could thus create a small (civilian) fleet to cruise cable areas, signaling to the Russian Navy — and any other outfit that may be up to no good — that they’re being watched.
“The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines has caused a real awakening among operators of sea-based infrastructure,” said retired Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad, a former chief of the Swedish Navy. “They’re beginning to think about which role they can play in keeping their installations safe.”
Commercial vessels aren’t allowed to harm intruders, of course — our navies and coast guards exist to protect countries against such seaborne attacks.
And according to Terras, whose military career began when he was conscripted into the Soviet Navy, NATO navies should track Russian vessels more closely. “Commercial ships have AIS [automatic identification systems, required for all but the smallest commercial vessels], but they can obviously turn it off,” he pointed out. “So, you need visual coverage, radar coverage to help you recognize what sort of Russian vessels are approaching and what they’re doing. Then we can identify areas of concern. Once we identify this, we can send ships to follow these vessels.”
Terras’ military service was aboard a frigate that shadowed NATO vessels. “We were always following American aircraft carriers to see what they were doing,” he said. “If we can do such monitoring of Russian vessels together with other NATO states, it would make the task easier for everyone. Sweden joining NATO would bring significant capability because they have the largest navy in the Baltic Sea.”
And because navies and coast guards can’t be everywhere all the time, operators could partner in this. “There will be practical details that need to be addressed,” Grenstad noted. “For example, when something happens, who should respond?” But by working out such important details in advance, including through exercises, governments and operators will be prepared.
The same could be true for land-based infrastructure, where operators could assist the police and the armed forces — a proposal reminiscent of local patrols in my parents’ tiny town. With the closest police office is about 10 miles away, the local entrepreneur who owns several of the town’s establishments has hired a retired cop to be out on the “beat” — on foot or in his car — sending a clear message to prospective delinquents, even though he can’t arrest anyone.
And infrastructure protection should involve the public too, much like when the Swedish Navy launched a “See it, say it, sorted” campaign two years ago — a step that has already proven decidedly useful. To be sure, members of the public can be mistaken, or deliberately report false sightings, but most citizens genuinely want to help keep their surroundings safe.
Who knows, some could even turn out to be as useful as Ireland’s fishermen.
Last year, when the Russian Navy announced it was going to conduct exercises off the coast of Ireland in February, no amount of pleading from Dublin dissuaded them.
Then Ireland’s fishermen stepped in.
“Our boats will be going out to that area on the first of February to go fishing,” Patrick Murphy, the chief executive of the Irish South and West Fish Producers Organization, told POLITICO. “When one boat needs to return to port, another will head out, so there is a continuous presence on the water. If that is in proximity to where the [military] exercise is going, we are expecting that the Russian naval services abide by the anti-collision regulations.”
Russia cancelled the exercise.
Which all goes to show — with the trinity of government, private sector and the public, we can erect a “defensive wall” to deter menacing intruders.