The author is a retired Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force and former Director-General of Joint Force Development at the Ministry of Defence.
Many questioned why President Zelensky was so adamant about supplying F-16 fighter jets to his forces in Ukraine. Could one particular aircraft have such a big impact? For the F-16, the answer is yes.
When he used the G7 summit to announce that the US would help train Ukrainian pilots to fly the planes, Joe Biden included his allies in the decision. In effect, Zelensky hijacked the event so that major countries turned in favor of Ukraine at a time when the Russian military leadership appeared to be killing itself.
Biden initially kept quiet about F-16 training because of concerns about escalation. The White House has overcome this caution, signaling an increase in their risk appetite. Its other concern is that the Ukrainians will not be able to operate the jets efficiently. NATO typically pairs the F-16 with a full range of support aircraft considered essential to its operations: electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, and air command and control. Critics argue that without these, the planes would be useless.
The easiest charge to dismiss is that it takes 18 months to train Ukrainian pilots. Recent tests by the U.S. Air Force have proven that although the F-16 is a high-performance fighter, experienced Ukrainian pilots can learn to fly it within four months.
The fact that the Ukrainian military has integrated Western weapons on ex-Soviet aircraft has a timescale that should have embarrassed our own peace process. There are legitimate questions about who does deep maintenance on this western aircraft, but maintaining the F-16 at the front shouldn’t be a problem: it’s a simple single-engine aircraft that is produced in high numbers, so spares are plentiful.
The bigger question is who maintains the supply of Western air-to-air missiles. The American Amraams are very capable, but cost an estimated $1 million each. The longer-range European Meteor is even more expensive. While national war stockpile levels are understandably classified, it is an open secret that most NATO air forces are short. As a matter of urgency, allies would do well to speed up their missile supply chains.
Lack of supporting air power is more difficult to remedy. Of course, Ukraine cannot replicate NATO’s support functions. But that doesn’t have to be: Kiev isn’t looking for a package of expeditionary air power to operate at long distances, deep into enemy territory. It just needs to put the Russian Air Force (VKS) at a disadvantage over Ukraine.
Wars to date have shown that VKSs are limited to operating in very small formations and only over land under their control. But it is protected by a broad range of surface-to-air missiles and has longer-range air-launched weapons, giving it an advantage over Ukrainian equipment.
Equipped with long-range radars, sensors and missiles, the F-16 would restore the Ukrainian air force’s qualitative and quantitative superiority — and push the VKS back to Russia. In turn, this will protect Ukraine’s ground forces and its critical infrastructure. But improving its effectiveness without a broader aerodynamic package will require imagination.
An integrated air defense system is much better than one that works alone. The Ukrainian air force must link its western surface-to-air missiles to its advanced radars to give its pilots an enhanced picture of air combat. Ground-based electronic warfare systems can significantly degrade the performance of Russian radars and thus its surface-to-air missile belt. The use of rapid-prototype drones in reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defense missions will make Russian fighter jets even more vulnerable. This largely ground-based support system – much cheaper than airborne systems – will allow Ukraine to maintain the initiative in air combat.
Finally, there is an ethical dimension to consider. NATO would fight Russia by first winning the air battle and then using air superiority to wage a more effective land war. Given the weaknesses of the VKS, this is not a pipe dream. But limited Western donations have so far forced Ukraine to ground-grinding tactics. We restricted Kiev from fighting in ways we would not, and restricted us from causing casualties.
We should reverse this position if we are going to defeat Russia. The F-16 decision is a big step in the right direction. The jets may not arrive in time to assist Ukraine’s spring offensive, but the news has already weighed on the Kremlin’s military and political calculations. The F-16 is not a panacea, but a totem of a fairer fight.